@article{oai:kyoritsu.repo.nii.ac.jp:00003020,
 author = {寺地, 功次 and Terachi, Koji},
 journal = {共立国際研究 : 共立女子大学国際学部紀要, The Kyoritsu journal of international studies},
 month = {Mar},
 note = {This paper looks into U.S. policy toward Indochina before and during the Geneva Conference of 1954, with particular attention to Laos, and examines why U.S. policymakers began to attach such disproportionate importance to this small country in the late 1950s.
 After the Vietminh invasion of Laos in early 1953, the stepped-up French military effort under the Navarre plan and its failure, U.S. policymakers began to realize the need for a more direct U.S. role in advising and strengthening the indigenous armies and meeting local internal security needs in combating the Vietminh force in Indochina. Controversies also arose over whether or not the U.S. should commit its military force there to help the French war effort against the Vietminh. Secretary of State Dulles' call for "united action" in March 1954 was generally considered to be a request for the U.S. allies to join in joint military action in Indochina.
 The idea of "united action" had two objectives. One was to call for immediate military intervention by the allies to meet the worsening situation after the siege of Dien Bien Phu. The effort in this respect failed mainly because the British refused to join in any military adventure before the Geneva Conference. The other was the longterm objective of establishing a collective defense structure for Southeast Asia. The British government was not opposed to this idea and agreed with the U.S. to start joint planning for the establishment of SEATO.
 The Geneva Conference for Indochina began in May 1954. Laos and Cambodia became a controversial and dominant issue as soon as it started. The U.S. and its allies demanded the separate treatment of Laos and Cambodia from that of Vietnam and for the withdrawal of the Vietminh force from the two countries. The communist side opposed and demanded that Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam should be treated in one package and in the same manner, with the leftist fighting groups in Laos and Cambodia given the same status as the Vietminh. A compromise was eventually achievedVietnam was temporarily divided into the north and the south while Laos and Cambodia retained their integrity with the promise of the Vietminh withdrawal. But the two northern provinces in Laos were designated as "regroupment zones" for the leftist Pathet Lao.
 In Geneva, the Eisenhower administration refused to negotiate with China and the Vietminh, kept its distance from the substantive discussions and did not join in the final declaration of the conference. This does not necessarily mean that U.S. policymakers were totally dissatisfied with its outcome. They may have given up working at the international level, but continued and stepped up their effort at the regional and local levels.
 At the regional level, during and after the Geneva Conference, U.S. policymakers prepared a draft treaty for Southeast Asian collective defense with their British counterparts. The discussion was widened to include other countries and the Manila treaty was concluded in September 1954. The treaty declared that its members would cooperate against "subversive activities directed from without" as well as against aggression by armed attack. It also had a clause for the "treaty area" that designated Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam as an area of defense for SEATO. At the same time, U.S. policymakers were careful not to make SEATO a NATO-type organization which could have automatically committed the U.S. to the military defense of Southeast Asia where it had little control at the time. This was generally considered a weakness of SEATO. However, part of the importance of SEATO lay in the fact that, because of this weakness, U.S. policymakers began to regard their commitment more in terms of local defense and internal security. It is also important that the Eisenhower and successive administrations used SEATO as a justification for U.S. military intervention in Indochina.
 At the local level, the final declaration of the Geneva Conference and the agreement on cessation of hostilities in Laos allowed the U.S. to expand its effort for local defense and internal security, which was under consideration before the Geneva Conference. They prohibited foreign troops and bases in Laos, but some clauses could be interpreted not to totally prohibit Laos from seeking military assistance from other countries for its own defense.
 All these factors contributed to the belief that Laos was a test case for the new U.S. policy after Geneva. Unlike Vietnam, Laos was not divided and the legitimacy of its royal government was not questioned in Geneva. U.S. aid to Laos came to be regarded as even more significant in strengthening and defending the internationally recognized state from internal subversion and aggression from outside., 論説, Articles},
 pages = {63--114},
 title = {1954年ジュネーブ会議とアメリカの対ラオス政策},
 volume = {31},
 year = {2014},
 yomi = {テラチ, コウジ}
}