{"created":"2023-06-19T11:34:34.590744+00:00","id":3087,"links":{},"metadata":{"_buckets":{"deposit":"fbb38479-d369-4724-8051-51215039b38a"},"_deposit":{"created_by":17,"id":"3087","owners":[17],"pid":{"revision_id":0,"type":"depid","value":"3087"},"status":"published"},"_oai":{"id":"oai:kyoritsu.repo.nii.ac.jp:00003087","sets":["133:274:141:216"]},"author_link":["12781","12781"],"control_number":"3087","item_1_biblio_info_14":{"attribute_name":"書誌情報","attribute_value_mlt":[{"bibliographicIssueDates":{"bibliographicIssueDate":"2015-03","bibliographicIssueDateType":"Issued"},"bibliographicPageEnd":"109","bibliographicPageStart":"71","bibliographicVolumeNumber":"32","bibliographic_titles":[{"bibliographic_title":"共立国際研究 : 共立女子大学国際学部紀要"},{"bibliographic_title":"The Kyoritsu journal of international studies","bibliographic_titleLang":"en"}]}]},"item_1_creator_6":{"attribute_name":"著者名(日)","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"寺地, 功次","creatorNameLang":"ja"},{"creatorName":"テラチ, コウジ","creatorNameLang":"ja-Kana"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{}]}]},"item_1_creator_8":{"attribute_name":"著者名(英)","attribute_type":"creator","attribute_value_mlt":[{"creatorNames":[{"creatorName":"Terachi, Koji","creatorNameLang":"en"}],"nameIdentifiers":[{}]}]},"item_1_description_12":{"attribute_name":"抄録(英)","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"The United States embarked on a course of providing direct military assistance to Laos after the Geneva Conference of 1954. This paper examines how U.S. policy toward Laos developed during the first year after the conference. The Geneva agreement on Laos stipulated that the communist Pathet Lao（PL）regroup in the two northern provinces and that general elections be held for its integration into the kingdom in 1955. As soon as the conference ended in July 1954, the Eisenhower administration decided to divert the remaining U.S. aid to the French force in Indochina to the \"free states\" of Indochina. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff（JCS）and the Defense Department were reluctant to recommend a force level for the Lao army and the total amount of military aid to Laos. This was partly because no foreign troops were allowed in Laos under the Geneva agreement, which meant that the U.S. could not send a Military Assistance Advisory Group（MAAG）to Laos to monitor and control the execution of its military aid.\nHowever, the reluctance of the JCS/Defense turned out to be rather symbolic. The provision of direct aid to Laos was already a top-level National Security Council（NSC）decision in July and NSC 5429/5 of December declared that the U.S. should \"make every effort... to defeat Communist subversion and influence, to maintain and support friendly non-Communist governments\" in Laos as well as in Cambodia and South Vietnam. By the end of December, the Eisenhower administration started providing the Royal Lao Government（RLG）with \"cash grants\" for the maintenance of its army. This was done even before the administration made a final decision on the amount of U.S. aid to Laos for 1955. The JCS/Defense did not object to providing these \"cash grants\" for Laos.\nMoreover, when the JCS finally made its recommendation on the Lao army force level for \"political considerations\" in late January 1955, it proposed sending Vientiane a group of \"civilians with military experience\" to administer U.S. aid to Laos. This led to the establishment of the Programs Evaluation Office（PEO）in Vientiane by the end of the year, which eventually functioned as a MAAG in Laos.\nAll through this period, U.S. officials exerted strong pressure on RLG leaders not to make unnecessary concessions in their negotiations with the PL for the upcoming elections. U.S. officials felt that some Lao leaders were naive in believing the widelyshared view among the Lao that Souphanouvong, the top PL leader, and other PL members were not really communist. Whenever they heard of news about the possible inclusion of PL leaders in a united government, they opposed it and even hinted at the suspension of U.S. aid. The negotiations between the RLG and the PL eventually collapsed and the elections were not held in the PL-controlled provinces in 1955.\nIn and after 1955, U.S. aid came to cover most of the military expenditures of the RLG. But American assistance was not limited just to keeping a strong Lao regular army in place. As NSC 5429/5 emphasized, the U.S. also sought to strengthen the internal security capabilities of Laos \"to defeat Communist subversion and influence.\" To achieve this purpose, U.S. military aid to Laos was coupled with other U.S. efforts during 1955.\nFirst, U.S. officials in Vientiane proposed the prompt creation of an \"effective police-gendarmerie force\" in Laos. By the end of 1955, the police-gendarmerie force numbered about 1,000, and the U.S.-sponsored para-military training of Lao officers was also under way in Thailand. The force was expected to increase to 4,000 over the next two years.\nAnother U.S. program was the creation of an \"auto-defense\" force. It was covertly funded by the U.S. and was begun approximately in June 1955. The Lao army helped its agents and certain hill tribes to organize para-military resistance forces in the PLcontrolled areas. The \"auto-defense\" force numbered over 10,000 by the end of 1957 and became the major anti-guerrilla unit against the PL.\nIn 1955, the U.S. also proposed the military training of Lao army officers in Thailand. It was believed to have started in 1956. The Lao military training was also done in the U.S. in later years. At the same time, the U.S. encouraged Thai-Lao military planning, helped Laos to receive helicopters from Thailand and contributed to creating an air force in Laos.\nAll in all, U.S. decision-making regarding assistance to Laos after Geneva was a more systematic and organized process than the past studies on Laos often suggest, which tend to emphasize policy differences and the haphazard way of decision-making within the Eisenhower administration. However, this does not mean that U.S. policy toward Laos during this period was \"rational.\" The simplistic and dichotomous approach of U.S. policymakers toward the political settlement in Laos, which rejected negotiations with the PL, coupled with U.S. military and para-military assistance, which laid too much emphasis on internal security, sowed the seeds of problems the U.S. would face in later years.","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_1_description_2":{"attribute_name":"記事種別(日)","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"論説","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_1_description_3":{"attribute_name":"記事種別(英)","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_description":"Articles","subitem_description_type":"Other"}]},"item_1_source_id_13":{"attribute_name":"雑誌書誌ID","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_source_identifier":"AA12307731","subitem_source_identifier_type":"NCID"}]},"item_1_text_9":{"attribute_name":"著者所属(日)","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_text_value":"共立女子大学国際学部"}]},"item_files":{"attribute_name":"ファイル情報","attribute_type":"file","attribute_value_mlt":[{"accessrole":"open_date","date":[{"dateType":"Available","dateValue":"2015-04-10"}],"displaytype":"detail","filename":"kokusai32_3terachi.pdf","filesize":[{"value":"3.7 MB"}],"format":"application/pdf","licensetype":"license_11","mimetype":"application/pdf","url":{"label":"kokusai32_3terachi","url":"https://kyoritsu.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/3087/files/kokusai32_3terachi.pdf"},"version_id":"f2b333a3-0f98-4b9c-95d7-c5e51aa12b5b"}]},"item_language":{"attribute_name":"言語","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_language":"jpn"}]},"item_resource_type":{"attribute_name":"資源タイプ","attribute_value_mlt":[{"resourcetype":"departmental bulletin paper","resourceuri":"http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501"}]},"item_title":"1954年ジュネーブ会議後のアメリカの対ラオス援助体制の構築","item_titles":{"attribute_name":"タイトル","attribute_value_mlt":[{"subitem_title":"1954年ジュネーブ会議後のアメリカの対ラオス援助体制の構築","subitem_title_language":"ja"},{"subitem_title":"U.S. Policy toward Laos after the Geneva Conference","subitem_title_language":"en"}]},"item_type_id":"1","owner":"17","path":["216"],"pubdate":{"attribute_name":"PubDate","attribute_value":"2015-04-30"},"publish_date":"2015-04-30","publish_status":"0","recid":"3087","relation_version_is_last":true,"title":["1954年ジュネーブ会議後のアメリカの対ラオス援助体制の構築"],"weko_creator_id":"17","weko_shared_id":-1},"updated":"2023-09-04T01:53:57.549986+00:00"}