@article{oai:kyoritsu.repo.nii.ac.jp:00003284,
 author = {寺地, 功次 and Terachi, Koji},
 journal = {共立国際研究 : 共立女子大学国際学部紀要, The Kyoritsu journal of international studies},
 month = {Mar},
 note = {This study looks at U.S. policy toward Laos from after the elections in May, 1958 through the outbreak of the civil war in 1960, and examines how U.S. involvement in Lao politics contributed to the deteriorating situation in Laos. This paper constitutes the third and final part of the study and examines the period from July, 1960 through December, 1960.
On August 9, 1960, the Second Paratroop Battalion of the Royal Lao Army, led by a young officer named Kong Le, staged a successful coup in Vientiane. The conservative Somsanith government resigned, and Kong Le asked Souvanna Phouma, a former neutralist prime minister, to form a new government. The parliament and the king eventually supported the formation of the Souvanna government.
Kong Le's coup was a challenge to the power of General Phoumi Nosavan, the unpopular defense minister, and his anti-communist group, who controlled the government and the military in Laos. Kong Le made a harsh criticism of the corruption of government officials and top military leaders and the intervention in Lao politics by the U.S. Phoumi and his group had enjoyed strong support from the U.S. since the elections in 1958. Kong Le also promised to pursue a policy of neutrality for Laos.
Phoumi refused to cooperate with Souvanna and Kong Le and moved to his hometown, Savannakhet, in southern Laos. In early September, he started an open rebellion against the Souvanna government with the support of some of the royal army troops.
The U.S. policy after Kong Le's coup vacillated between working with and working against the Souvanna government. But one important aspect of its policy never changed－whatever happened, the U.S. supported Phoumi and gave overt and covert military aid to his troops. As soon as Kong Le took over Vientiane, the U.S. started providing arms, money and food to Phoumi's troops, essentially working against the Souvanna government.
However, aiding rebels against the formally installed government presented a serious dilemma for U.S. policy. A war between the royal army troops seemed only to help increase the influence of the leftist Pathet Lao (PL) in Laos. There was no Lao politician other than Souvanna who could bridge the gap between the neutralist and the conservative forces against the PL. These considerations prompted the U.S. government to put pressure on both Souvanna and Phoumi to come to terms. Partly because of "a great deal of pressure" by the U.S., a cease-fire was agreed in late September, but there was little progress in reaching a political settlement between the Souvanna government and the Phoumi group. The U.S. tried to persuade Phoumi to join the Souvanna government, but Phoumi refused and insisted on proceeding with his "original plan" to retake Vientiane by force. The U.S. opposed his plan and tried to "work through and with Souvanna Phouma as the legal facade of legitimate government." But Souvanna pursued his own policy of reaching an agreement on a government of national union with the PL and opening diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.
Souvanna opened diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in early October, and Soviet airplanes carrying military and non-military materials began arriving in Vientiane by the end of the month. At the end of October, Souvanna also announced that his government had reached an agreement on national union with the PL. These actions were taken by Souvanna despite the temporary suspension of U.S. aid and the sending of Washington's special mission to Vientiane to persuade Souvanna. This new development prompted the policymakers in Washington to reach the conclusion that "Souvanna's usefulness in achieving [the] essential U.S. objectives is about at an end."
By the end of November, the U.S. withdrew its opposition to Phoumi's military plan to invade Vientiane by taking "the wraps off Phoumi" and providing his troops with heavy artillery and increased military aid. A full-fledged civil war started in Laos. Phoumi's troops successfully took control of Vientiane by December 16. In fact, his military plan for retaking Vientiane was not his own. U.S. military advisors provided the original plan. And they advised and acted together with Phoumi's troops in the invasion of Vientiane.
The picture of the conflict in Laos greatly changed. The U.S. policy toward Laos after the August coup contributed to the division of the country and invited the Soviet Union's first military commitment in Laos. The PL increased its control in many parts of Laos during the fiasco after August. The U.S. sided with the rebel force which had little support in and outside Laos. Still, at a White House meeting on December 31, outgoing President Dwight D. Eisenhower emphasized that "we must not allow Laos to fall to the Communists, even if it involves war in which the U.S. acts with allies or unilaterally." But the U.S. was betting on Phoumi and his force despite its successive policy failures in Laos and without much prospect for success., 論説, Articles},
 pages = {107--148},
 title = {ラオス内戦とアメリカ (3)},
 volume = {35},
 year = {2018},
 yomi = {テラチ, コウジ}
}