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ラオス内戦とアメリカ (2)
https://kyoritsu.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/3198
https://kyoritsu.repo.nii.ac.jp/records/319821ebdb68-f06e-4410-8506-0e8f83fc9913
| 名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
|---|---|---|
kokusai34_4terachi (3.6 MB)
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| Item type | 紀要論文(ELS) / Departmental Bulletin Paper(1) | |||||||||
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| 公開日 | 2017-04-28 | |||||||||
| タイトル | ||||||||||
| タイトル | ラオス内戦とアメリカ (2) | |||||||||
| 言語 | ja | |||||||||
| タイトル | ||||||||||
| タイトル | The United States and the Civil War in Laos : Part 2 | |||||||||
| 言語 | en | |||||||||
| 言語 | ||||||||||
| 言語 | jpn | |||||||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||||||
| 資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 | |||||||||
| 資源タイプ | departmental bulletin paper | |||||||||
| 記事種別(日) | ||||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||||||
| 内容記述 | 論説 | |||||||||
| 記事種別(英) | ||||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||||||
| 内容記述 | Articles | |||||||||
| 著者名(日) |
寺地, 功次
× 寺地, 功次
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| 著者名(英) |
Terachi, Koji
× Terachi, Koji
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| 著者所属(日) | ||||||||||
| 共立女子大学国際学部 | ||||||||||
| 抄録(英) | ||||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||||||
| 内容記述 | This study looks at U.S. policy toward Laos after the elections in May, 1958, through the outbreak of the civil war in August, 1960, and examines how U.S. involvement in Lao politics contributed to the deteriorating situation in Laos. This paper constitutes the second part of the study and examines the period from May, 1959, through June, 1960. After the elections in May, 1958, the U.S. government shifted its policy toward supporting a larger role for the military in Lao politics. The leaders of the leftist Pathet Lao (PL) political party were excluded from Phoui Sananikone's cabinet after the elections. In May, 1959, the scheduled integration of the PL force into the royal army, which the Geneva agreement of 1954 had stipulated, failed, and one of the two remaining PL battalions escaped into the jungle. In July, a military clash between the PL force and the royal army occurred, which finally ended the hope for the peaceful integration of Laos. The Royal Lao Government (RLG) accused the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) of sending its army units into Laos to aid the PL force in their fight with the royal army. The RLG brought the matter to the United Nations in August. The U.S. government knew that there was little evidence for the presence of DRV army units in Laos, but did not challenge the RLG's claim. In response to the RLG's request, the U.N. Security Council decided to send a fact-finding subcommittee to Laos. However, the subcommittee's report in November did not prove the presence of DRV units in Laos. The military clash with the PL force alarmed U.S. policymakers. They were particularly disturbed by the inability of the royal army to suppress the relatively small PL force. This prompted the U.S. to decide to increase both the royal army force and the auto-defense force by 4,000. The U.S. also sent about 100 U.S. military training personnel to Laos beginning in July. The inability of Phoui's government in the face of the PL attacks also reignited the political struggle among Lao political leaders. Phoui and his party of traditional conservative politicians were challenged by the Committee for the Defense of National Interest (CDNI). The CDNI originally consisted of younger political and military leaders, but it became increasingly controlled by the army. In December, the army units led by Lieutenant General Phoumi Nosavan staged a bloodless military coup against Phoui's government. U.S. policymakers were given the information of the impending coup beforehand, but it decided to "stand discreetly aloof and let nature take ［its］ course". Despite its acquiescence to a military coup, the U.S. exerted strong pressure on Phoumi and other army leaders to organize a provisional cabinet headed by a civilian leader. A civilian-headed cabinet with army generals was formed, but it was quite apparent where the powe rlay. The provisional government held general elections in May, 1960. Despite the fact that only a few PL candidates could participate in them, the government changed the election rules in favor of the conservatives and the army used strong-arm tactics and intimidation and even rigged elections. The results were so lopsided that even U.S. officials, as well as other western officials and observers, frowned on the behavior of the CDNI/military leaders. Again, the U.S. exerted strong pressure on them to prevent the emergence of a government headed by Phoumi. Phoumi grudgingly gave up the post of prime minister, and another civilian-headed government was formed. However, despite its fluctuating policy toward Laos, the fact remained that the U.S. permitted a military coup and consistently supported the army and the successive army-cntrolled governments. As a result, the influence of civilian leaders in Lao politics was substantially reduced, with ominous implications for future U.S. involvement in Laos. |
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| 雑誌書誌ID | ||||||||||
| 収録物識別子タイプ | NCID | |||||||||
| 収録物識別子 | AA12307731 | |||||||||
| 書誌情報 |
共立国際研究 : 共立女子大学国際学部紀要 en : The Kyoritsu journal of international studies 巻 34, p. 47-84, 発行日 2017-03 |
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